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Abstract 
 
  
Inter-municipal cooperation is an important public service delivery reform, whose 
drivers move beyond simple concerns with costs and economic efficiency, to policy 
issues related to governance structure and spatial context. We conduct a meta-
regression analysis based on the existing multivariate empirical literature to explore 
what factors explain divergence in results in the existing empirical studies. We find 
strong evidence that fiscal constraints, spatial, and organizational factors are significant 
drivers of cooperation. Our meta regressions do not yield results to explain divergence 
in results on community wealth, economies of scale or racial homogeneity.  More 
studies on these factors are needed to understand how these factors might affect 
cooperation.  Future theoretical and empirical research should give more attention to 
spatial and organizational factors to develop a better understanding of factors driving 
cooperation and how they differ across local government structures and regions. 
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Factors Explaining Inter-municipal Cooperation in Service Delivery: 
A Meta-Regression Analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
In the field of local government service delivery reform, most policy attention has been focused on 
contracting to the private sector (Boyne 1998; Hodge 2000). But another, equally important reform 
strategy, especially in the US, inter-municipal cooperation, has begun to garner more research 
attention as it has grown in importance (Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot 2012). Inter-municipal 
cooperation involves contracts or joint production with other local governments as a means to gain 
economies of scale, improve service quality, and promote regional service coordination across 
fragmented local government regions (Agranoff and McGuire 2003). Cooperation tends to be 
voluntary in the US (Holzer and Fry 2011; Feiock 2007) and more formal and structural (involving 
more regulation) in Europe (Lago-Peñas and Martinez-Vazquez 2013; Hulst and van Montfort 2007). 
It is typically found to be a more politically viable alternative than amalgamation (Feiock and Scholz 
2010) and for this reason is an important alternative of interest to policymakers of local government 
reform. 
As the literature on cooperation has grown, one distinguishing feature is the broader set of 
factors that appear to drive or inhibit cooperation as compared to privatization. Theory and 
empirical evidence on local government contracting to the private sector has primarily focused on 
service delivery characteristics related to cost savings and transaction costs (Brown and Potoski 2003; 
Bel and Fageda 2008; Levin and Tadelis 2010; Hefetz and Warner 2012; Wassenaar, Groot and 
Gradus 2013; Gradus, Dijkgraaf and Wassenaar 2014). But empirical and theoretical evidence on 
inter-municipal contracting gives more attention to factors related to the local government 
organization (structure, management, spatial factors) (Bel, Fageda and Warner 2010; Zafra et al 2013, 
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Hefetz et al 2012, Tavares and Camoes 2007). Comparative studies of the US and Europe have 
noted that while European studies are more focused on cost savings, US studies are more concerned 
with government organization factors, in part because the structure of responsibilities and finance in 
the US creates more diversity in service competencies making cooperation both more needed and 
more difficult (Bel and Warner 2015).  
Although shared services delivery is a widespread phenomenon, no meta-regression analysis 
of the literature has been conducted. By contrast, systematic evidence is available on other reforms, 
such as privatization, where meta-regression analyses have been published on the factors explaining 
privatization (Bel and Fageda 2009), and on the relationship between privatization and costs (Bel, 
Fageda and Warner 2010). Our current analysis bears some similarity to Bel and Fageda (2009), 
because we also deal with factors explaining decisions related to government reform; here, 
cooperation instead of privatization. We do not attempt to deal with the issue of cooperation and 
costs as too few empirical studies exist in the literature (see Bel and Warner 2015 for a list). 
A large enough number of empirical analyses on the motivations for inter-municipal 
cooperation are now available.  Thus, our paper provides an extensive and in-depth analysis of the 
empirical evidence on the factors explaining inter-municipal cooperation. We conduct a meta-
regression analysis based on the existing empirical literature to permit a systematic analysis of the 
similarities and differences in the results of empirical studies of motivations for inter-municipal 
cooperation and the implications for public management. 
2. Theoretical background 
To set up our meta-regression analysis we first outline the major theoretical components of interest. 
These can be grouped into two major categories: cost and fiscal factors, and organizational and 
governance characteristics. These two broad categories have been seen as key categories in the 
theoretical and empirical literature on service delivery reform. Because of this, we believe they may 
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be especially important for policy on inter-municipal cooperation, and our meta-regression analysis 
of the available empirical literature can shed light on the relative importance of these factors. 
Cost and Fiscal Factors 
Cost structure: scale and density 
One of the challenges facing local governments is that size and fragmentation make it difficult to 
capture the benefits of economies of scale, or the need for coordination across the metropolitan 
region. While the economy has moved to primarily a city-regional scale (Lobao, Martin and 
Rodriguez Pose 2014), local government organization reflects the historical development of the 
region and may result in sub-optimal jurisdiction size. This is especially a concern in Southern 
Europe and in the US where there is a long tradition of many small municipalities (Lago-Peñas and 
Martinez-Vazquez 2013; Holzer and Fry 2011). The literature on local government has paid attention 
to the optimal size for service provision (Olson 1969; Mirrlees 1972; Oates 1972).  Volume of 
service, size of population, and dispersion of population are the three dimensions on which the 
optimal geographic scale depends (Ladd 1992).  
Olson (1969) argued for fiscal equivalence, that government boundaries should match the 
area enjoying the local public good. When municipal boundaries do not match the service area, some 
form of municipal cooperation is a natural alternative to achieve both economies of scale and fiscal 
equivalence. Amalgamation has been offered as one alternative to suboptimal size, but 
amalgamations are typically not voluntary and result from laws made at a higher jurisdictional level.  
While Reingewertz (2012) finds reduced expenditures resulted from amalgamation in Israel, most 
empirical papers on the topic find no evidence of positive impacts from consolidation either on 
costs/debt or on scale economies (i.e. Hinnerich 2009;  Jordahl and Liang 2010; Allers and 
Geertsema 2014). 
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By contrast, Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961, p. 836) envisaged intermunicipal 
cooperation as an alternative to amalgamation when they suggested that small municipalities could 
make use of special arrangements to act jointly to provide services when the municipal boundary is 
suboptimal. Cooperation has proven more popular than amalgamation among local governments 
(Holzer and Fry 2011).  Research across Europe and the US has found cooperation can be especially 
important in helping small municipalities reach economies of scale (Gradus et al, 2013; Zafra-Gomez 
et al 2013; Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot 2012; Warner 2006; Mohr, Deller and Halstead 2010; 
Bel and Costas 2006; Bel, Fageda and Mur 2013).  
The most common measure in the empirical literature for economies of scale is population, 
though studies also frequently include attention to community wealth and fiscal stress as drivers of 
cooperation. Sonenblum, Kirlin and Reis (1977) focus on scale issues and extra-local spillovers in 
service delivery arrangements. Most studies find cooperation to be negatively related to population as 
larger cities enjoy internal scale economies (Levin and Tadelis 2010; Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-
Gadot 2012; Bel, Fageda and Mur 2014). 
Fiscal factors 
Fiscal factors have been an important driver of local government reform in the last decades, 
particularly as local government fiscal stress has grown in the 2000s. Whereas privatization was seen 
as the primary reaction to these restrictions, cooperation is also a tool to create cost savings. In the 
US cooperation has increased since the Great Recession and is now more common than 
privatization (Homsy and Warner 2014). Governments generally cooperate when it is in their self-
interest, and may tend to exclude governments with higher costs or lower fiscal capabilities from 
cooperative agreements (Lowery 2000). Because of this, wealthy communities may engage less 
frequently in cooperation (Warner and Hefetz 2002). However, wealthy communities can also be 
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desired partners for cooperative agreements, because of their ability to contribute to fund the service 
(Kown and Feiock 2010). 
Fiscal constraints, related to debt and expenditure burden or limits on local revenue raising, 
can be differentiated from fiscal capacity related to community wealth. In recent years local 
governments have faced increased constraints due to austerity policy, and tax and expenditure 
limitations passed by higher levels of government (Clifton 2014). Understanding the limits of 
cooperation as a policy tool requires differentiating fiscal constraints from community capacity to 
understand their differential effects on cooperation as a tool of policy reform. 
Institutional and Governance Structure 
Fragmented local government systems face the challenge of providing services efficiently and 
addressing problems of service spillovers and tax exporting. In the US many scholars argue that 
when regional governance is voluntary and lacks sanctioning authority or taxation power, the ability 
to promote cooperation is undermined -especially in services where there is heterogeneity in need 
and resources across the region (Frug 1999; Lowery 2000; Warner and Hefetz 2002). Key differences 
between Europe and the US make comparison across studies of cooperation especially important. 
US local governments are characterized by a higher level of fiscal autonomy and service 
responsibilities and lower levels of intergovernmental aid, while in continental Europe basic local 
services (solid waste, water, etc.) are compulsory for all municipalities, so service levels are more 
homogeneous (Lago Peña and Martinez 2013). These features facilitate cooperation in Europe and 
may explain why most European studies focus on cost savings. The US studies by contrast, focus 
more on the institutional challenges to cooperation, which result in part from differences in local 
government structure in the US (Bel and Warner 2015).  
Cooperation requires attention to political institutions and the structure of policy networks, 
which places an important role on the structure of management and markets among local 
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governments in the region where cooperation takes place (Hefetz and Warner 2012). Cooperation is 
easier when there is homogeneity in interests, needs and resources, and institutional homogeneity in 
budget rules and service requirements (Feiock 2007). Other important factors that may facilitate 
cooperation are longer tenure and more professional management (Brown and Potoski 2003; Hefetz, 
Warner and Vigoda-Gadot 2015). Regional governance bodies also facilitate cooperation, as this 
gives time for reciprocal relationships to build both weak and strong ties across the network 
(Thurmaier and Wood 2004; Wood 2006; Bel, Fageda and Mur 2013).  
 Unlike New Public Management reforms that emphasize competition, cooperation is based 
on collaborative relations that extend across time and space. The possibility of joint production with 
neighboring municipalities is driven not only by concerns with economic efficiency, but also by 
factors which include regional coordination and improved effectiveness of service delivery and 
reduced contracting risk (Joassart-Marcelli and Musso 2005; Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot 2012, 
Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot 2015). Theory also addresses geographic considerations related to 
metropolitan location. Suburbs, as similar sized localities in the metropolitan region, offer the most 
attractive market for cooperation (Warner and Hefetz 2002; Joassart-Marcelli and Musso 2005; 
Hefetz et al 2012).  Cooperation is also high in rural areas, which lack private market alternatives 
(Warner and Hefetz 2003; Warner 2006; Mohr et al 2010) and may use cooperation to gain market 
power (Bel, Fageda and Mur 2013; 2014).  Feiock (2007, 2013) has outlined a theory of institutional 
collective action that builds from Ostrom’s (1990) studies of polycentric local government where 
cooperation is based on trust, reciprocity and collective benefits across the metropolitan region.  
Governance Costs of the Cooperative Agreements 
Inter-municipal cooperation may be subject to lower governance costs than privatization because 
cooperating governments share similar objectives (Brown 2008). Cooperation is based on a public 
market of cooperating governments, not a competitive market of for profit providers (Warner 2011). 
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Recent theoretical and empirical work emphasizes the importance of the public partner in creating 
more stable service delivery arrangements (Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot 2014). However, 
Feiock (2007) has emphasized that transaction costs from cooperation involve substantial costs 
related to information, negotiation, and monitoring.  Indeed Marvel and Marvel (2008) have found 
challenges with monitoring due to lower ability to sanction partners in voluntary inter-municipal 
cooperative agreements in the US.  Sørensen (2007) has found similar problems with dispersed 
ownership in cooperative agreements in Norway.  
Several studies (i.e. Levin and Tadelis 2010; Hefetz and Warner 2012) have shown that when 
service-related transaction costs are high, inter-municipal contracting is preferred to for profit 
contracting. Girth et al (2012) point to the opportunity costs of creating a market in for profit 
contracting, costs that are avoided in inter-municipal contracting. Professional management can help 
overcome these transaction cost challenges and council manager forms of government have been 
shown to have higher levels of cooperation (Hefetz et al 2012, 2015; Nelson and Svara 2011). 
However, differences in wealth, demographic makeup, and geographic location of participating 
communities may still produce problems creating a willing market of participating municipalities 
(Lowery 2000; Warner and Hefetz 2002; Warner 2006), and result in coordination problems after the 
cooperation is in place (Feiock 2007). Heterogeneity undermines local cooperation because it 
imposes higher transaction costs (Feiock 2007). In the US, racial homogeneity/ heterogeneity have 
been found to be potential drivers of transaction costs in the governance of the cooperation (Leroux 
and Carr 2007; Kown and Feiock 2010). 
3. Empirical studies on inter-municipal cooperation: What do they tell us 
about drivers and obstacles? 
We have been able to find 49 articles (either published or forthcoming) and working papers including 
multivariate analysis of factors explaining cooperation, as table 1 shows. We reviewed both published 
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and unpublished papers from the fields of Economics, Public Policy, Public Administration, Political 
Science, Urban Studies, and Area Studies. The 10 unpublished papers included in our analysis were 
presented in international meetings specializing in public policy, and/or available in large working 
paper collections, such as Econlit, Social Science Research Network, Ageconsearch, Proquest, and 
Repec-Ideas. Furthermore, we searched for papers from data bases specialized in PhD Dissertations 
and Grey Reports such as OpenSIGLE¸ European Science Research Council (ESRC) and E Thesis 
Online Services (ETHOS) in Europe, and US GAO and The National Technical Information 
Service (NTIS) in the U.S. Papers selected for our analysis had to have homogenous measures of 
cooperation –e.g. a regression model with cooperation as the dependent variable.  
To our knowledge, our database includes all published and unpublished papers that estimate 
factors explaining cooperation. In all, we have 38 journal articles, one book chapter, nine working 
papers and one poster presented at a Conference (where enough information was provided).  The 
database was constructed by the authors. We used as key words for the search “intermunicipal 
cooperation”, “interlocal contracting”, and “joint contracting”. The search was completed on 
December 2014. Overall, we took into consideration the Meta-Analysis of Economics Research 
(MAER-net) reporting guidelines in Stanley et al (2013). 
The 49 studies presented in table 1 include a total of 171 estimations where the dependent 
variable is a measure of the frequency of inter-municipal cooperation. Typically, the measure is (1) a 
dummy variable with one for cooperative delivery and 0 otherwise in single service studies; and (2) a 
percentage of the services each jurisdiction provides via cooperative delivery for multiservice studies. 
Interestingly, most studies (38) focus on the US, either the whole country or one/several states. 
Eleven papers study countries other than the US. Next we provide a review of the most frequently 
used variables in these studies.  
(Table 1 here) 
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Fiscal Constraints have been operationalized by means of different variables, among which the 
most frequent are debt per capita, own revenues per capita, laws limiting debt, etc. Table 2 shows 
that 70% of the estimations in our database included variables related to fiscal constraints. Among 
these, more than half the estimations in our database have shown fiscal constraints to have a 
significant effect on cooperation.1 As expected, a large majority of them find a positive effect of 
fiscal constraints. Results showing the opposite (a negative influence of fiscal constraints on 
cooperation) are relatively rare, around one third the number showing positive influence. Non-
significant results are obtained in little more than half the estimations.  
(Table 2 here) 
Community Wealth: The diversity in theoretical expectations regarding community wealth is 
well reflected in the empirical results obtained. More than half of the available estimations considered 
community wealth as an explanatory variable for cooperation, usually specified as income per capita. 
No significant relationship was found in almost two thirds of the estimations. Much less frequent are 
estimations with significant results for community wealth, and they are almost evenly split between 
positive effect (20%) and negative effect (15%). Therefore, theoretical expectations on community 
wealth are divergent, and empirical results so far do not help to solve the question. 
Scale Economies: Service and place characteristics are the most important drivers of economies 
of scale. Among these dimensions, size of population is the variable most frequently used in 
empirical studies analyzing factors explaining cooperation. This is explained by the fact that data on 
population is more readily available than data on volume of output when a single service is analyzed, 
and because population is the best indicator of volume of output when the analysis is of multi-
service character. Around 70% of the estimations in our sample use number of inhabitants as an 
explanatory variable for cooperation. Half of these estimations do not find population to be 
                                                            
1 We take significance as evaluated by the authors in each work. 
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significant. Among the estimations where this variable is significant, the most frequent result is that 
population has a negative and significant association with cooperation. Therefore, there exists some 
partial evidence that the frequency of cooperation decreases as population increases, as expected 
from theoretical views on economies of scale. 
Spatial Factors: Inter-local cooperation frequently involves geographic proximity of the 
cooperating municipalities. Cities and suburbs in metropolitan regions represent a market of similar 
sized municipalities in close proximity. One third of the estimations in the database included 
variables related to cities and suburbs as drivers of cooperation, and more than half of these found 
the variable to be significant and positive, as shown in Table 2. Thus, results are largely consistent 
with theoretical expectations. 
Organizational Factors (Manager): The council-manager form of city government is understood 
as more professional and less subject to political interference than the mayor-city model, and thus 
may serve as a driver for service delivery reform. More than one third of the available estimations 
analyze the relationship between council-manager form of government and frequency of 
collaborative agreements, of which half of the estimations find the manager variable to be 
significantly related to cooperation. Among these estimations where manager is significant, almost 
80% find a positive association between manager and cooperation, consistent with theoretical 
expectations. 
Racial homogeneity/heterogeneity: Little more than one third of the available estimations (58) and 
little more than one quarter of the studies (13) have included specifications of racial 
homogeneity/heterogeneity. More than half of the estimations find racial 
homogeneity/heterogeneity significant, and among these a large majority find a positive effect of 
homogeneity. Note, however, that the majority of estimations showing a positive (negative) 
association between homogeneity (heterogeneity) and cooperation come from Blaeschke (2014). 
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Also, two of these papers (Morgan, Hirlinger, and England 1988; Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991, 
together include eight estimations) specify the variable as a proxy for private interests and political 
factors (rather than transaction costs related factors). Therefore, there is divergence in what the 
variable measures.  
Service Level Transaction costs: In spite of the important theoretical and conceptual work 
available on transaction costs, the empirical evidence is still quantitatively limited. Only 33 
estimations have included variables reflecting transaction costs. However, among these estimations 
42% find a positive and significant relationship (more service related-transaction costs are associated 
with more cooperation) and only seven find a negative relationship. Overall, and consistent with 
theoretical expectations, cooperation is typically found to be higher when services are more asset 
specific and other factors related to transaction costs are present.  
Finally, we note that ‘political factors’, another type of variable usually considered in the 
empirical analysis of local government reform, is seldom used in empirical analysis on drivers of 
cooperation. Only twelve papers –and 30 estimations- consider variables reflecting political factors, 
and the estimations are divided between those that consider political orientation of elected 
politicians, and others that consider the type of election (i.e. election at large). The diversity in the 
way the political variables are specified is very wide. Therefore, we cannot specify expectations about 
the influence of political factors on cooperation.  
4. Empirical strategy: Data and methods 
There are different reasons why analyses that focus on a single topic have a large variation of 
empirical results. Among these, Stanley and Jarrell (1989) emphasize three types of categories for 
these reasons: (1) uniqueness of the data sets used in each particular study; (2) biases induced by 
model misspecification, and (3) distinctive statistical methods. We use meta-regression analysis to 
analyze the pattern and diversity of findings in the empirical studies. In this way, we are able to 
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appraise if significant relationships in papers that study drivers and obstacles of inter-municipal 
cooperation depend heavily on the individual characteristics of each study. Meta-regression analysis 
has been used frequently in economic and public policy research, after it was introduced in the late 
1980s. Recently it has been used to analyze variability of empirical results in the field of public 
services and local government (i.e. Bel and Fageda 2009; Bel, Fageda and Warner 2010; Carvalho, 
Marques and Berg, 2012). We are not aware of any meta-regression analysis published to explain the 
differences between empirical results in studies on drivers and obstacles of inter-municipal 
cooperation, thus our research contributes to filling this gap. 
The most frequently applied empirical strategy in meta-regression analysis is that suggested 
by Stanley and Jarrell (1989),  
bj = β + αkZjk + ej  j =1,2,….L             (1) 
where bj is the reported estimate of β of the jth study, β is the true value of the parameter of interest, 
Zjk are the meta-independent variables that measure relevant characteristics of an empirical study, and 
αk are the coefficients associated with those independent variables, and, ej stands for the residuals.  
The initial empirical strategy for implementing the meta-regression is to use the coefficients 
or t -statistic values estimated in each study as a dependent variable in the meta-regression. A first 
problem we confront is that we have neither t-statistics nor standard errors for many estimations. 
Moreover, we cannot compute t-statistics based on coefficients and standard errors in other cases, 
because these are given with all zeroes (i.e., 0.000). Therefore, the sample would be significantly 
reduced if we used t-statistics. Furthermore, the studies on factors explaining inter-municipal 
cooperation have used a wide variety of variables to test the relationship between cooperation and 
economic and organizational factors. Thus the number of homogeneous t-statistics that we have 
been able to identify is very limited, which we are aware is a limitation of our research.   
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Our objective is to analyze whether the relationships we are interested in are significant. To 
do so, we follow the strategy applied by Bel and Fageda (2009). We construct a set of dependent 
variables as dummy variables that take a value of one if a study finds a significant relationship 
between inter-municipal cooperation and the corresponding set of explanatory variables: fiscal and 
economic, organizational and spatial. Table 3 displays the set of dependent variables, and the set of 
independent variables (moderator variables) that concern particular characteristics of the studies. 
Note that we do not include specific regressions for service level transaction costs2 or politics, 
because the small number of available estimations does not allow us to conduct a sensible estimation. 
We specify the dependent variables as follows:  
(Table 3 here) 
Fiscal constraints: We find a significant influence of fiscal constraints on inter-municipal 
cooperation when variable(s) that capture this effect has(ve) a positive influence on cooperation. The 
variables most commonly used are debt burden, tax burden, own fiscal revenues, and supra-local 
regulation limiting local taxation and debt.3 
Community wealth: We find a significant influence of community wealth on inter-municipal 
cooperation when the variable that captures its effect has a negative influence on cooperation. The 
variable is usually specified as income per capita. 
                                                            
2 In fact, neither the estimation nor the single variables were significant for this factor (results available upon 
request).  
3Studies use different measures for fiscal constraints, and this could damage homogeneity, which would 
constitute a limitation of our analysis. However, the fact that this and other dependent variables include 
several different measures does not crucially affect the robustness of our study, because we have been careful 
when analyzing the implication of each measure, and the homogeneity among them.  
14 
 
Economies of scale: We find a significant influence of economies of scale on inter-municipal 
contracting when the variable that captures this effect has a negative influence on cooperation. By 
far, the variable most commonly used is population size. 
Spatial factors: We find a significant influence of spatial factors on inter-municipal cooperation 
when the variable that captures this effect has a positive influence on cooperation. The variable most 
commonly used is city in a metropolitan area or suburb. 
Organizational factors: We find a significant influence of manager-type of government on inter-
municipal cooperation when the variable that captures this effect has a positive influence on 
cooperation. The variable most commonly used is council-manager form of local government. 
Racial homogeneity: We find a significant influence of racial homogeneity on inter-municipal 
cooperation when the variable that captures this effect has a positive influence on cooperation. The 
variable most commonly used is percent racial/ethnic majority in population. 
The independent variables used are those common in meta-regression analysis, reflecting 
particular characteristics of the studies: year of data collection, number of observations, geographical 
area and method of estimation. These variables reflect the type of categories used to explain 
variations, such as the uniqueness of the data sets, or distinctive statistical methods. Furthermore, 
area and time differences may reflect institutional contexts or learning over time. As in Bel and 
Fageda (2009), we include two additional characteristics of the studies: whether the estimations are 
single-service or multi-service (a few studies consider different services but use single-service 
estimations), and whether small municipalities (less than 5000 population) are included in the sample 
or not. Finally, we include two additional variables. One indicates whether the study focuses on 
cooperation solely, or whether it is considered among other alternatives (e.g. private contracting) for 
service delivery. The other is a measure of research quality based on the latest available (2014) impact 
15 
 
factor in the Journal Citation Reports of the journal in which the article was published. Journals not 
considered in JCR and other studies received a 0.  
5. Results 
We first regress the dependent variables against the independent (moderator) variables by means of 
probit estimation, robust to heteroskedasticity. We estimate the following set of relationships: 
COOPERATION = F(FC, SE, CW, OF, SF, RH ),               (2) 
Fiscal constraints = F(Year, sample, continent, multi-service, method, method, popsize, onlycoop, impactfactor),    (3) 
Community Wealth =F(Year, sample, continent, multi-service, method, method, popsize, onlycoop, , impactfactor), (4) 
Economies of Scale = F(Year, sample, continent, multi-service, method, method, popsize, onlycoop, impactfactor),  (5) 
Spatial Factors = F(Year, sample, continent, multi-service, method, method, popsize, onlycoop, impactfactor),        (6) 
Organizational Factors=F(Year, sample,continent, multi-service, method, method, popsize, onlycoop, impactfactor) (7) 
Racial Homogeneity=F(Year, sample, continent, multi-service, method, method, popsize, onlycoop, , impactfactor), (8) 
 
Results from the six meta-regressions are provided in Table 4. In all cases the estimations are 
robust and have clustered estimations from the same study. Recall that each observation is a study 
analyzing factors explaining inter-municipal contracting. The dependent variables are dummy 
variables that take a value of one when a study finds a significant relationship between inter-
municipal contracting and that variable (except for community wealth and economies of scale which 
are coded 0= negative relationship). Positive coefficients of the moderator variables indicate that 
studies with that characteristic tend to provide a positive significant relationship between the 
corresponding dependent variable and cooperation. A negative sign implies that the associated 
characteristic of the study is less likely to be associated with positive and significant results. Note the 
opposite interpretation holds for community wealth and economies of scale. 
(Table 4 here) 
We obtain relatively high R-squares (recall we are conducting probit estimations) for most of 
our estimations: Fiscal Constraints, Economies of Scale and Racial Homogeneity. The explanatory 
capacity is smaller but still significant for Spatial Factors and for Organizational Factors, and is very 
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low for Community Wealth. Overall, the explanatory results of our meta-regression estimations 
compare favorably with those of studies using similar methodology, such as Bel and Fageda’s (2009) 
analysis of factors explaining local privatization.  
The hypothesis that fiscal constraints would trigger more cooperation is well established in 
the literature. Results show that more recent studies (year) are less likely to find an effect of fiscal 
constraints. Also, studies done for the US are less likely to find fiscal constraints as a driver of 
cooperation.  
By contrast, studies that include smaller places (<5000 population) in the sample are more 
likely to find a positive effect of fiscal constraints, as small places are more likely to benefit from 
cooperation. The same is true of multi-service studies, as cooperation in these studies is measured on 
an organization-wide level, not just in a single service, so the potential for fiscal impact is greater. 
Furthermore, studies using logistic regression also tend to find a significant positive influence of 
fiscal constraints. Recall that logistic regression models are more robust than OLS when the 
dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1. Finally, studies that focus only on cooperation tend 
also to find a significant positive influence of fiscal constraints. 
The surprising result in the fiscal constraint model is the lower likelihood of finding fiscal 
constraints as a driver in the US models. Prior meta-regression analysis on local government 
privatization found US studies were more likely to find fiscal constraints as a driver (Bel and Fageda 
2009). What explains the divergent results between privatization and cooperation as regards fiscal 
constraints? Local government fragmentation in the US is high and the motivations for cooperation 
extend beyond fiscal constraints to concerns regarding service coordination across the region and 
service quality improvements (Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot 2012). While privatization is driven 
heavily by cost and fiscal constraints, cooperation is used for a broader range of purposes in the US, 
namely service quality and service coordination, but these variables are not captured well in the 
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regression model literature. Our regressions cannot capture other motivators because the number of 
studies addressing them is too small. Furthermore, in Europe, small places often receive more service 
for the same price under cooperative agreements. A primary type of cooperation in Europe is joint 
governance of services, but US studies primarily measure inter-local contracting. The type of 
contracting in Europe is much more prone to cross subsidies among the partner municipalities. 
Turning now to community wealth, the meta-regression studies with larger sample sizes 
(generally considered to be more robust) are less likely to find significant effects (recall the 
community wealth variable is reverse coded).  The meta-regression also shows that studies where 
cooperation is considered alone are more likely to find a negative relationship between cooperation 
and community wealth. Rich communities may feel less pressure to meet economic efficiency goals, 
or to cooperate with their neighbors. Also, studies published in higher quality journals tend to find 
this negative relationship between community wealth and cooperation.  
Regarding economies of scale, the main operational expectation is that as population 
increases, cooperation would decrease. Recall that economies of scale exist when population has a 
negative and significant relationship with cooperation. We expected that studies containing more 
small places (<5000) would be more likely to find a scale effect. However, that moderator variable is 
positive, meaning that it is less likely that a relationship with scale is found. Studies conducted for the 
US and studies focusing only on cooperation are less likely to find effects of economies of scale. This 
may reflect the wider range of factors driving cooperation in the US studies – beyond economic 
considerations.  Multiservice studies are more likely to find scale effect but this result is only 
significant at the 10% level.  
With respect to spatial effects, we did not find any significant moderator. The equation itself 
did a poor job of explaining differences in results across studies. This result is interesting. A majority 
of estimations show that cities in metropolitan areas have higher rates of cooperation, and only a 
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small minority of studies find cities with lower levels of cooperation (see table 2). Our meta-
regression shows these results are not differentiated by any moderator variable. Therefore, theoretical 
expectations are met by empirical results, 55% of the observations found this result, and 
differentiation across studies is not explained by the intrinsic characteristics of the estimations. City 
status in a metropolitan region, where proximity helps create a market for cooperation, is a relevant 
driver of inter-municipal cooperation.  
The meta-regression on organizational factors (manager-type government) dropped the 
continent moderator variable as all the studies measuring this effect are in the US. Three variables 
show a positive relationship with manager influence: logistic method, sample including small 
municipalities and studies focusing only on cooperation. Our theoretical expectation was that 
professional management would be positively associated with cooperation and indeed this is true – 
especially in studies including smaller places (<5000 population). As in the case of spatial effects, our 
meta-regression shows that divergence of results in the literature is not heavily driven by the 
characteristics of the estimation. Forty two percent of the estimations have a positive association 
between managers and cooperation (this being a large majority among the results finding a significant 
association, see Table 2), thus, the theoretical expectation is met by the empirical evidence.  
The meta-regression on racial homogeneity also dropped the continent moderator variable. 
In this case, almost all variables show a significant relationship with racial homogeneity. More recent 
studies, studies with small municipalities and studies published in high impact outlets tend to find a 
positive association between racial homogeneity and cooperation, and the opposite happens with 
almost all other moderators. This equation is the most powerful in explaining the divergence of 
results. The meta-regression shows that studies that include a wider range of governments are less 
likely to find racial homogeneity to be a factor. These include the larger sample sized studies, 
multiservice studies and those which only look at cooperation.  
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It is common in meta-regressions for papers included to provide more than one observation 
(see table 1). That can cause a problem of dependence across observations (Ringquist, 2013).4  To 
deal with this, we replicated the probit estimations by including a dummy variable to control for the 
observations obtained from the study by Blaeschke (2014), which is - by far - the work that provides 
more estimations, up to 22. The results were unchanged. Furthermore, in order to take full account 
of within-study autocorrelation, we followed the suggestion in Ringquist (2013, p. 218) and used 
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) to estimate a random effects meta-regression model. Table 
5 shows the results. 
(Insert table 5 around here) 
Results obtained from our GEE estimations are very similar for fiscal restrictions and for 
organizational factors; thus, we take the results for these factors as solidly established. The 
estimations on the other factors yield somewhat different results, which we discuss next. 
The estimation for community wealth does not yield any significant variables and, 
furthermore, shows a very poor overall fit. There is no association between any moderator and 
community wealth. In this sense, it is worth recalling that two thirds of studies found no effect and 
those that did were almost evenly split between positive and negative effects (see Table 2).  Although 
community wealth has been described in the literature as an important factor, our meta-regression 
provides limited insights into why we find such divergent results across studies, and has a large 
majority of non significant results overall. Indeed, it might well be that community wealth by itself is 
                                                            
4   Other potential sources of dependence across observations are the use of common data sets in different 
studies, and different studies conducted by similar research teams. While studies for countries other than the 
US use different sets of data, most studies for the US use data from ICMA. We believe our variable Continent 
(US=1) helps to deal with that. With respect to potential dependence across observations, because the same 
researchers have done more than one study, in our case a team of researchers conducted six of the papers, and 
several researchers contributed with three papers. We are aware this can be a limitation of our results. 
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not a relevant driver of cooperation. 
Regarding economies of scale, only two variables are still significant and these only at the 
10% level. Studies conducted for the US and studies where only cooperation is considered are less 
likely to find economies of scale, as before. However, population size is not significant when we take 
into account dependence across observations. By contrast, the new estimation for spatial factors 
shows a better fit, and multiservice has a strong negative correlation with cooperation.  Finally, in the 
estimation for racial homogeneity several variables cease to be significant. However, we cannot 
conclude anything in this case, as this estimation did not converge.  
Overall, when we take into account dependence across observations caused by studies 
providing many observations, several variables cease to be significant in several estimations. Fiscal 
constraints, spatial factors, and organizational factors appear to be the most robust models across 
estimations. 
6. Meta-regression robustness tests 
One concern in meta-regression analysis is studies might be more likely to be published if they find 
significant relationships between variables. Because of this, publication bias is an important limitation 
of meta-regression analysis (Stanley, 2005). Publication bias in meta-regression may be examined by 
means of funnel asymmetry tests -FAT- (Stanley, 2005, 2008). FAT tests are based on the estimation 
of the reported effect of a study and its standard errors.  
The studies included in our meta-regression analyses use different variables to test the 
relationship between cooperation and each set of factors. Because of this, we can implement our 
tests for publication bias only for the most common variables for each group of hypotheses, which 
reduces the samples available for the publication bias test. Furthermore, some studies report the 
coefficient and statistical significance, but not standard errors or t –statistics, so we cannot include 
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these studies in the tests. All this forces us to be cautious when interpreting results of the FAT, 
because of the low number of observations that can be used.  
With respect to publication bias, FAT (1) and FAT (2) show that we find strong evidence of 
publication bias for fiscal constraints, because in both estimations [using 1/SE and sqrt (sample 
size)] the intercept significantly differs from zero. We find weak evidence of publication bias for 
spatial factors, as the intercept is significant, but only at 10%. If there is publication bias, the 
direction is positive in both cases, which means that the studies are obtaining overly large effect of 
fiscal constraints and of city in metropolitan areas. We find even weaker evidence for racial 
homogeneity, as publication bias found with FAT (1) is contradicted by the results from FAT (2). 
Table 6 shows results of the funnel asymmetry tests for these three factors.5 Therefore, we do not 
believe publication bias is an important problem for racial homogeneity.  
(Table 6 here) 
Publication bias may be filtered by means of estimating a multivariate FAT meta-regression 
model (Stanley 2005). We deal with this issue following methodological guidelines pointed out in Bel, 
Fageda and Warner (2010). This will imply re-estimating equations for fiscal constraints (equation 3) 
and for spatial factors (equation 6), including square root of sample size, and excluding sample size. 
Our previous results with respect to moderator variables in both equations, for fiscal constraints (3) 
and for spatial factors (6) are confirmed, because the sign and explanatory significance of each 
independent variable do not change.6 Thus the results from our original equations are robust.  
 
 
                                                            
5FAT1 for community wealth, scale and organizational factors show no evidence of publication bias, and are 
available upon request. 
6Results for these multivariate FAT meta-regressions are available upon request.  
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7. Discussion and Agenda for Future Research 
Inter-municipal cooperation is a growing government reform and one gaining increasing theoretical 
and empirical attention. Some studies treat cooperation as another alternative service delivery 
mechanism in the arsenal of new public management style reforms, an alternative to privatization but 
driven by similar motivators, primarily cost reduction. This is most commonly found in the 
European studies. However, in the US studies we find attention to a much broader array of 
motivating factors relating to spatial location and organizational factors. This raises the question of 
whether cooperation requires a broader theoretical framing than traditional studies of government 
contracting. We present theoretical expectations that extend beyond cost concerns (fiscal stress, 
economies of scale) to address governance structure and spatial differences. 
Theoretically, economies of scale would be a primary motivator for cooperation, however, 
we find population is not significant in the majority of studies. Fiscal constraints are more likely to be 
found significant in studies that include small municipalities, but less likely in more recent studies and 
in studies from the US. We believe this may be explained by differences in governance 
structure. Although small, fragmented local government is characteristic of the US and some 
European countries (France, Spain, Italy), more standard service delivery obligations and cross 
subsidies due to the wider use of joint production and municipal corporations in the European 
context (Tavares and Camoes 2007; Gradus et al 2014) may allow cooperation to better address fiscal 
constraints than in the US.  
While fiscal constraints are important drivers, we find some evidence of publication bias in 
study results. Policy makers typically assume that inter-municipal cooperation will yield cost savings, 
but the empirical literature on cost savings is limited and cost savings are often not found (Sørensen 
2007; Holzer and Fry 2011; Bel and Warner 2015). The growing popularity of inter-municipal 
cooperation is not explained by fiscal drivers alone. 
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The majority of studies find higher rates of cooperation among suburbs (cities in 
metropolitan areas). Cooperation, unlike privatization, is rooted in space. The surrounding local 
governments create a public market of potential cooperation partners. Multi-service studies are less 
likely to show a positive effect of metropolitan location on cooperation. These studies may be 
capturing the potential for economies of scope within the municipality – which may explain lower 
rates of cooperation.  Cooperation occurs both across space and across services and studies of 
factors driving cooperation need to be structured at the level of the local government, as a multi-
product entity, in order to capture this effect. Single service studies may be appropriate for studies of 
cost, but they may not capture the broader array of factors driving local government cooperation. 
Professional management is an important driver of cooperation and our meta-regression 
shows studies including small municipalities are more likely to find positive impacts of professional 
management. While much of the literature on transaction costs has focused on service characteristics 
(Brown and Potoski 2003; Levin and Tadelis 2010), our meta-regression shows the importance of 
organizational and spatial factors as part of transaction costs. These results confirm Hefetz and 
Warner’s (2012) call for a broader conception of transaction costs, which includes attention to spatial 
and managerial issues.  
Our results suggest important implications for policy makers.  Local governments are facing 
greater fiscal stress since the Great Recession, and inter-municipal cooperation is being promoted as 
a solution.  While fiscal constraints may drive cooperation, it is not clear that cooperation will result 
in efficiency gains. We do not find clear support for economies of scale in our analysis. We do find 
that professional management is important to manage the transaction costs of cooperation. It 
policymakers wish to promote more cooperation, they should provide support for professional 
management and study the potential economic benefits of cooperation, as these are not always 
assured. Policy makers also should recognize that cooperation is rooted in space.  Spatial proximity 
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facilitates cooperation in metropolitan areas, but what can policy makers do to promote cooperation 
among more sparsely settled rural communities?  Our spatial analysis also shows the potential trade 
off between cooperation and economies of scope.  Cooperation across services within a community 
may be as important as cooperation across communities.   
Our meta-regression analysis of factors explaining cooperation demonstrates that 
cooperation requires a broader theoretical framing that includes factors beyond the standard 
efficiency concerns. Studies of alternative service delivery reforms must move beyond individual 
service level analyses and focus on the policy challenges affecting local government as an 
organization in its spatial and structural context. Future scholarship needs to give more attention to 
these organizational and spatial concerns.  
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Table 1. Main characteristics-multivariate studies on drivers of intermunicipal cooperation in service delivery 
Authors 
Number of 
Estimations 
Year 
Sample Sample Country service Method Size 
Morgan et al (1988) 1 1982 56 USA Multi OLS >25000 
Campbell & Glynn (1990) 2 1984 158 USA – GA Multi OLS Counties 
Ferris & Graddy (1991) 2 1982 309 USA Multi Logistic >25000 
Morgan & Hirlinger (1991) 7 1983 615 USA Hybrid** OLS >25000 
Ferris & Graddy (1994) 1 1982 350 USA Multi Logistic >25000 
Lackey et al (2002) 1 1998 88 US-TN Multi Ols All 
Warner & Hefetz (2002) 6 1992-97 303-1056 USA Multi Logistic >2500 
Brown & Potoski (2003) 4 1997 48538 USA Multi Logistic >2500 
Joassart & Musso (2005) 1 1982-90-97 1333 USA – CA Multi Logistic All 
Krueger & McGuire (2005) 4 1997 2825 USA Multi Logistic >2000 
Shrestha (2005) 4 1990-99 4100 USA Multi OLS >400000 
Tiller & Jakus (2005)  3 1993 95 USA – TN Landfills Logistic Counties 
Rodríguez & Tuirán (2006) 4 2002 2425 México Multi Logistic All 
Warner (2006) 3 1992-97-2002 1031 to 1414 USA Multi Logistic >2500 
Wood (2006) 1 2003 46 USA – KS, MO Multi OLS >2500 
Carr et al (2007) 10 2005 460 US-MI Several* Logistic All 
Leroux & Carr (2007) 10 2005 314 to 316 USA – MI Several* Logistic All 
Shrestha & Feiock (2007) 1 2002 1793 USA-GA Multi Logistic >2500 
Tavares & Camões (2007) 4 2006 719 Portugal Multi Logistic/Poisson All 
Brown et al (2008) 2 1997 18510 USA Multi Logistic >2500 
Lamothe et al (2008) 2 2002 9037 USA Multi Logistic >2500 
Bae (2009) 2 2002 2011 USA-GA Multi Logistic All 
Carr et al (2009) 1 2005 3675 USA – MI Several* Logistic >10000 
Girard et al (2009) 1 2004 1422 USA – NH Multi Logistic All 
Jung & Kim (2009) 6 2002 238 to 3033 USA Multi OLS > 2500 
Sundell et al (2009) 5 2008 289 Sweden Multi OLS All 
Zullo (2009) 4 2002 1530-2183 USA Multi OLS Counties 
Krueger & Bernick (2010) 2 1997 3664 USA Multi Logistic >2500 
Kwon & Feiock (2010) 2 2003 1072 USA Multi Logistic >10000 
Leroux et al (2010) 1 2004 919 USA Multi Logistic >50000 
Levin & Tadelis (2010) 5 1997-2002 18588 to 19244 USA Multi Logistic >1115 
Mohr et al (2010) 1 1995-97-2004 36605 USA-IL,NH,WI Multi Logistic All 
Di Porto et al (2011) 5 1995-2003 164592 to 325827 France Multi Ols/Logistic All 
Krueger et al (2011) 2 1997 25429 USA Multi Logistic >2500 
Leroux & Pandey (2011) 1 2004 117 USA Multi OLS >50000 
Mazzalay (2011) 4 2007-08-09 380 to 552 Argentina-CO Multi QAP All 
Shrestha & Feiock (2011) 2 2002 1216 to 1305 USA – GA Multi Logistic >2500 
Hefetz, et al (2012) 4 1992-97,2002-07 1304 to 1418 USA Multi Logistic >2500 
Hefetz & Warner  (2012) 4 2007 898 to 4745 USA Multi Logistic >2500 
Reinagel & Stricth (2012) 2 2010 471 USA Multi Logistic All 
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Bel, Fageda & Mur (2013) 1 2008 92 Spain – Aragón Waste Logistic All 
De Mello & Lago (2013) 8 2009 393 to 3757 Brazil & Spain Several* Logistic >5000 
Di Porto et al (2013) 3 1995-2003 202146 France Multi Logistic All 
Jung & Jeong (2013) 2 1990-95-2000 22935 USA Multi  Logistic > 20000 
Bel, Fageda & Mur (2014)  1 2008 80 Spain – Aragón Waste Logistic All 
Blaeschke (2014) 22 2011 112 Germany-Hessen Multi Logistic < 50000 
Hefetz et al  (2014) 2 2007 1432 USA Multi Logistic >2500 
Hefetz et al (2015) 2 2007 570-904 USA Multi Logistic >2500 
Garrone & Marzano, forth 3 2001-12 725 Lombardy-Italy Gas Logistic All 
Notes: Number of observations obtained from the corresponding study. QAP: Quadratic Assignment Procedure. 
.*These studies consider different services but conduct single service estimations. They are coded as single. 
.** This study includes multi service estimations as well as single service estimations. They are coded accordingly. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
  
35 
 
Table 2. Synthesis of descriptive results for the main explanatory variables in studies of inter-municipal 
cooperation in service delivery 
Fiscal constraints Community Wealth 
Positive 53 43.8% Positive 18       20.2% 
Negative 16 13.2% Negative 13       14.6% 
Non-significant 52 43.0% Non-significant 58       65.2% 
Total 121 100.0% Total 89       100.0% 
      
Economies of Scale (population) Spatial Effects  
Positive 20 16.4% Positive 33 55.0% 
Negative 38  31.1% Negative 4 6.7% 
Non-significant 64  52.5% Non-significant 23 38.3% 
Total 122 100.0% Total 60 100.0% 
      
Organizational Factors (Manager) Racial homogeneity 
Positive 26 41.9% Positive 24 41.4% 
Negative 5 8.1% Negative 7 12.0% 
Non-significant 31 50.0% Non-significant 27 46.6% 
Total 62 100.0% Total 58 100.0% 
      
Service Level Transaction Costs Politics 
Positive 13 41.9% Only 12 papers 
Negative 6 19.4%    
Non-significant 12 38.7%    
Total 31 100.0%    
 
Note: Community wealth is considered to be a driver of cooperation when per capita income has a negative and 
significant relationship with cooperation. Spatial effects measures geographic proximity as in city/suburb and is a driver 
of cooperation when it has a positive and significant relationship with cooperation. Economy of scale is considered to be 
a driver of cooperation when population has a negative and significant relationship with cooperation. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table 3. Variables used in the meta-regression analysis 
Dependent variable Description Observations
Fiscal constraints Dummy variable that takes value one if a study finds a significant 
(positive) relationship between variables for fiscal constraints and 
cooperation 
121 
Community wealth  Dummy variable that takes value zero if a study finds a significant 
(negative) relationship between variables for wealth and cooperation, 
and a value of one otherwise 
89 
Scale economies  Dummy variable that takes value zero if a study finds a significant 
(negative) relationship between variables for population and 
cooperation, and a value of one otherwise 
122 
Spatial Factors  Dummy variable that takes value one if a study finds a significant 
(positive) relationship between city in metropolitan area or suburb and 
cooperation 
60 
Organizational Factors  Dummy variable that takes value one if a study finds a significant 
(positive) relationship between manager-type government and 
cooperation 
62 
Racial Homogeneity  Dummy variable that takes value one if a study finds a significant 
(positive) relationship between racial homogeneity and cooperation  
58 
  
Independent 
(Moderator) variables 
Description Observations
Year Year of collection of data for dependent variables 171 
Sample Number of municipalities included in the considered sample 171 
Continent Dummy variable that takes value one when studies refer to US, and 
value zero when they refer to other countries 
171 
Service Dummy variable that takes value one when multiple services are 
considered, and value zero when just one 
sector is considered 
171 
Method Dummy variable that takes value one when a discrete choice method is 
used, and value zero when Ordinary Least Squares is used 
171 
PopSize Dummy variable that takes value one when the considered sample 
includes municipalities with a population lower than 5,000 inhabitants 
171 
Onlycoop Dummy variable that takes value one when the study focuses on 
cooperation solely  
171 
 ImpactFactor Impact Factor in JCR-2014 of the journal in which the article was 
published (if any). Papers in journals not included in JCR and also 
unpublished papers receive a 0.
171 
Note: Difference between number of observations of dependent and independent variables is due to the fact that the 
variables we take as dependent are not always present in all studies and estimations. 
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Table 4 Meta-regression robust estimates. Probit 
 
Moderator variables Dependent variable 
 Fiscal constraints Community Wealth Economies of Scale 
Year -0.12 (0.04)*** +0.02 (0.04) +0.07 (0.03)** 
Sample +1.7E-06 (1.9E-06) +6.0E-05(2.5E-05)** +1.1E-06 (2.1E-06) 
Continent (US=1) -1.68 (0.41)*** -0.22 (0.65) +1.04 (0.53)** 
Service (multi=1) +1.08 (0.33)*** +0.40 (0.38) -0.90 (0.53)* 
Method (logistic =1) +0.87 (0.34)** -0.36 (0.63) -0.32(0.32) 
PopSize (small inc. =1) +1.82 (0.64)*** -0.89 (0.83) +0.96 (0.49)** 
Onlycoop (coop= 1) +1.54 (0.43)*** -0.79 (0.43)* +1.29 (0.39)*** 
ImpactFactor +0.03 (0.25) -0.90 (0.37)** +0.05 (0.21) 
Intercept +244.60 (70.35)*** -42.36 (69.96) -131.84 (62.82)** 
Pseudo R2 0.352 0.116 0.201
χ2 (joint sig.) 66.96*** 17.45** 22.39*** 
Log pseudolikelihood  -53.54 -29.43 -60.47 
N  121 89 122
  
 Spatial Factors 
(city+suburb) 
Organizational 
Factors (Manager) 
Racial Homogeneity 
Year +0.02 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) +0.19 (0.05)*** 
Sample -2.1E-05(1.8E-05)  -8.21-0.6 (1.5E-05) -7.6E-0.4 (1.1E-0.4)***  
Continent (US=1) -0.92 (0.69) & & 
Service (multi=1) -1.20 (0.86) -0.27 (0.90) -1.18 (0.59)* * 
Method (logistic =1) -0.74 (0.47) +0.83 (0.45)* -1.91 (0.37)*** 
PopSize (small inc. =1) +0.37 (0.53) +1.45 (0.47)*** +2.93 (0.97)*** 
Onlycoop (coop= 1) -0.85 (0.57) +1.10 (0.49)** -3.52 (0.83)*** 
ImpactFactor +0.11 (0.38) +0.21 (0.27) +2.74 (0.32)*** 
Intercept -46.52 (57.97) +98.68 (61.93) -373.17 (100.00)*** 
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.134 0.447 
χ2 (joint sig.) 11.05 14.88** 91.50*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -36.55 -36.77 -9.17
N 60 62 38 
Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses (robust). Note 3: Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
Note 2: &: Omitted because of collinearity.  
Note 3:In the case of Racial Homogeneity the estimation dropped 20 observations because of collinearity (so, N=38). 
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Table 5 Meta-regression robust estimates. Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) 
 
Moderator variables Dependent variable 
 Fiscal constraints Community Wealth Economies of Scale 
Year -0.03 (0.10)*** +0.00 (0.01) +0.00 (0.01) 
Sample +7.5E-08 (4.0E-07) +5.5E-06(3.8E-06) +1.2E-07 (6.9E-07) 
Continent (US=1) -0.48 (0.11)*** -0.04 (0.10) +0.32 (0.19) * 
Service (multi=1) +0.32 (0.06)*** +0.04 (0.06) -0.06 (0.177) 
Method (logistic =1) +0.20 (0.11)* -0.02 (0.11) -0.03(0.05) 
PopSize (small inc. =1) +0.43 (0.16)*** -0.11 (0.16) +0.14 (0.13) 
Onlycoop (coop= 1) +0.44 (0.14)*** -0.12 (0.09) +0.29 (0.16)* 
ImpactFactor +0.02 (0.06) -0.13 (0.08) -0.03 (0.09) 
Intercept +59.66 (20.54)*** -3.86 (16.41) -2.41 (13.34) 
Wald(chi)2 391.40 8.57 15.70
Prob > chi2  0.00*** 0.38 0.05** 
N  121 89 122 
  
 Spatial Factors 
(city+suburb) 
Organizational 
Factors (Manager) 
Racial Homogeneity 
Year +0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) +0.04 (0.01)*** 
Sample -6.1E-06(6.5E-06)  -8.33-0.7 (5.6E-06) -2.1E-0.5 (1.1E-0.5)**  
Continent (US=1) -0.27 (0.34) & -0.47 (0.16)*** 
Service (multi=1) -0.39 (0.08)*** +0.26 (0.16) -0.01 (0.09) 
Method (logistic =1) -0.13 (0.15) +0.16 (0.19) -0.24 (0.15) 
PopSize (small inc. =1) +0.11 (0.15) +0.39 (0.12)*** -0.32 (0.21) 
Onlycoop (coop= 1) -0.26 (0.22) +0.29 (0.17) * -0.19 (0.11)* 
ImpactFactor +0.00 (0.14) +0.01 (0.09) +0.03 (0.09) 
Intercept -12.15 (17.68) +21.55 (21.51) -77.55 (27.53)*** 
Wald(chi)2 124.36 70.13 195034.00 
Prob > chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
N 60 62 58
Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses (robust). Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
Note 2: &: Omitted because of collinearity.  
Note 3: In the case of Racial Homogeneity, the estimation did not converge. 
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Table 6  Meta-regression tests (robust and clustered) 
FISCAL CONSTRAINTS 
Explanatory variables 
FAT (1)  
Dep. Variable t-Statistic 
FAT (2)  
Dep. Variable t-Statistic 
Intercept  1.705 (0.377)*** 2.136 (0.553)*** 
1/SE 0.0009 (0.0017) -
Sqrt (sample size) - -0.0061 (0.0037) 
N  32 32 
R2 0.0018 0.0614
SPATIAL FACTORS 
Explanatory variables 
FAT (1)
Dep. Variable t-Statistic 
FAT (2)
Dep. Variable t-Statistic 
Intercept  3.173 (1.505)* 4.509 (2.244)* 
1/SE 0.0218 (0.0154)  - 
Sqrt (sample size) - -0.0135 (0. 0149) 
N  38 38 
R2 0.0407 0.0124 
RACIAL HOMOGENEITY  
Explanatory variables 
FAT (1) 
Dep. Variable t-Statistic 
FAT (2) 
Dep. Variable t-Statistic 
Intercept  -0.921 (0.276)*** 0.381 (0.453) 
1/SE 0.0035 (0.0012)** - 
Sqrt (sample size) - -0.0375 (0.0214) 
N  25 25 
R2 0.2964 0.2512 
Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted by correlation between observations in 
the same study) 
Note 2: Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
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